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NO. 5 FEBRUARY 2020 Introduction 
Syrian Refugees in Turkey: 
Changing Attitudes and Fortunes 
Suat Kınıklıoğlu 
In view of a substantial loss in local elections and an urge to demonstrate that the 
Turkish government is in control of the situation, Ankara’s attitude toward the ap-
proximately four million Syrian refugees changed in July 2019. Security forces started 
to round up Syrian refugees, send them back to the Turkish provinces where they 
were registered, deport some, and encourage others to move to areas controlled by 
Turkey in northern Syria, including the conflict zone Idlib. The change in Turkish 
policy vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees as well as dramatic developments in Idlib have 
renewed international attention to the plight of the refugees. Ankara needs con-
tinued European support to deal with the situation, particularly if a new wave of 
refugees is forced to flee to Turkey from Idlib. 
 
Since 2012 Turkey has done a remarkable 
job in hosting close to four million refu-
gees, primarily from Syria, Iraq, and Af-
ghanistan. Ankara applied an open-door 
policy to Syrians escaping the violence in 
Syria until 2015 and has quickly set up 
camps for them in border regions. However, 
contrary to expectations in Ankara, the con-
flict dragged on, and the initial approach of 
simply hosting the refugees for a limited 
time period turned into all-encompassing 
long-term protection. 
Turkish society has shown great resili-
ence in absorbing a total number of refu-
gees that now equals the size of Croatia’s 
population, constituting almost five percent 
of Turkey’s population. Turkey has approxi-
mately one percent of the world population 
but, according to Amnesty International, it 
hosts nearly 15 percent of the global refu-
gee population. It is also one of the largest 
humanitarian assistance providers in terms 
of percentage of gross national income. 
That said, negative public perceptions 
toward the refugees have grown significantly. 
Although incidences of violence have been 
negligible, numerous public opinion polls 
confirm a stark decline in public support 
for hosting the refugees. Not surprisingly, 
Turkish citizens are expressing considerable 
concern about the future in relation to life 
with Syrian refugees. This negative trend 
is compounded by Turkey’s authoritarian 
political climate, an ongoing economic 
crisis, the suppression of the rule of law 
as well as freedom of expression, and the 
shortcomings of a peculiar presidential 
system. Although lower than in 2015, the 
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number of refugees trying to enter the EU 
illegally via Turkey is on the rise again. In 
2019 the number of refugees increased by 
46 percent compared with 2018. 
Election Loss Triggers Tougher 
Stance toward Syrians 
Turkey’s hegemonic Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) experienced a historic loss 
in local elections in 2019. The ruling AKP 
lost most major cities to the opposition, 
including Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya, Mersin, 
and Adana. One of the primary reasons for 
these losses was the widespread discomfort 
felt due to the Syrian refugees in Turkey’s 
urban centers. Recent public opinion polls 
confirm that Turks see the refugee issue as 
one of the most important problems facing 
the country. Syrian refugees are present in 
almost all Turkish cities, including cities far 
away from Syria, such as those on the Black 
Sea coast. Due to the government’s decision 
to close the camps gradually, the camp popu-
lation has decreased considerably. Refugees 
have moved to cities, taking their problems 
to urban settings with them. This situation 
has transformed the Syrian refugees into 
“urban refugees,” as 98 percent of them 
currently reside in cities. Consequently, even 
formerly welcoming attitudes by AKP sup-
porters have soured vis-à-vis the refugees. 
Although the AKP government knows that 
most of the refugees are unlikely to return 
to Syria anytime soon, the election loss ne-
cessitated the need to demonstrate to the 
Turkish public that Ankara was in command 
of the situation. Similar to the operation in 
Afrin in 2018, Operation Peace Spring, under-
taken in October 2019, was also reasoned 
on the need to resettle Syrian refugees into 
northern Syria – a point that helped boost 
Turkish public support for the operation. 
Syrian Refugees Associated with 
Erdoğan’s Syria Policy 
An important factor influencing Turkish 
citizens’ perceptions about Syrian refugees 
is the association with Turkey’s unpopular 
Syria policy. Since 2011 public opinion 
polls have reflected domestic apprehension 
with Turkey’s direct involvement in the 
Syrian civil war – an issue even further 
aggravated due to the recent bombardment 
and fighting in Idlib. In Turkey’s polarized 
political climate, the Syrian refugees are 
seen as a byproduct of a failed Syria policy. 
Furthermore, the refugees are overwhelm-
ingly conservative, religious, and sympa-
thetic to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
AKP, which puts them in direct contrast 
with Turkey’s urban middle-class opposi-
tion on values and lifestyle issues. However, 
there is also a sectarian dimension to the 
issue. Whereas the AKP has a distinct Sunni 
Weltanschauung, Turkey’s main opposition 
party is dominated by Alawites. The main 
opposition has been critical of Ankara’s 
Syria policy from the very beginning and 
has repeatedly called on the Turkish gov-
ernment to deal directly with President 
Bashar al-Assad. In other words, the antipa-
thy against the refugees is compounded by 
the sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict. 
Also, the AKP government’s argument that 
hosting such a large number of refugees 
demonstrates Turkey’s strength and status 
in the international arena increasingly 
rings hollow amidst a lingering economic 
crisis. Another aspect complicating the refu-
gee issue is the tension between the central 
government and the newly opposition-
administered cities that host the refugees. 
Until now, refugee issues have primarily 
been administered by the national govern-
ment, but an effective response to the issue 
requires better coordination and coopera-
tion with municipalities. That means more 
communication between Erdoğan and the 
newly elected opposition mayors. However, 
Erdoğan has demonstrated clearly that he 
does not wish the new mayors – especially 
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoğlu – to be-
come critical players on the refugee matter 
or other issues he deems important, such as 
the massive Canal Istanbul project, which 
aims to create an artificial seaway between 
the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea. The 
contradictions are self-evident. 
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Mutual Perceptions Diverge 
A recent study by the Turkish-German Uni-
versity’s Migration and Integration Research 
Center indicates that the perceptions of 
Turkish citizens vis-à-vis Syrian refugees 
have significantly turned negative. In stark 
contrast, the perceptions of Syrians about 
life in Turkey have dramatically improved; 
60 percent of Turks believe that Turkey has 
done its best to host the Syrians. Contrary 
to theories that Syrians are culturally close 
to Turks and therefore prefer to stay in 
Turkey, 82 percent of Turks feel they have 
no cultural commonalities with Syrians. 
While 72 percent of Turks believe that 
Syrian refugees will harm Turkey’s socio-
cultural structure, 74 percent think that 
public services will either deteriorate or 
diminish because of the refugees. 
Although Turks and Syrians cohabit com-
mon spaces in urban settings, they lead par-
allel lives with limited interaction. Never-
theless, perceptions among Syrian refugees 
vis-à-vis Turkish society are overwhelmingly 
positive. Most Syrians do not feel discrimi-
nated against and continue to harbor feel-
ings of gratitude and desire for co-existence 
toward their host society. Overall, most Syr-
ian refugees express that they are happy to 
live in Turkey and see the Turkish govern-
ment as the primary provider of critical 
assistance. 
Although objections to the refugees’ 
presence has increased among Turks, most 
Turks understand that they are likely to 
remain in Turkey for the foreseeable future. 
As Assad is regaining his grip over Syria, 
expectations about the refugees’ return to 
their homeland have significantly dimin-
ished. However, when asked, Turks still pre-
fer Syrians to be resettled in secure zones in 
Syria or want them to live in camps or cities 
that are set up especially for them. Whereas 
the government is working toward further 
integration, Turkish citizens prefer segre-
gation rather than integration and cohabi-
tation. Furthermore, resettling Syrians in 
“safe zones” in northern Syria is fraught 
with several difficulties. Apart from the 
financial aspects of resettlement, such as 
security, housing, and infrastructure, there 
is also the problem of convincing refugees 
to resettle in these “safe zones.” Currently, 
only 6 percent of Syrian refugees indicate 
that they would return to a “safe zone” in 
Syria. More than a quarter of Syrians refuse 
to return to Syria no matter what the con-
ditions, and most would only agree to re-
turn if Assad were removed, according to 
the aforementioned poll. Finally, various 
attempts to change the demographics of 
northern Syria since the beginning of the 
civil war in 2011 further complicate the 
resettlement issue. 
Divergence between 
Public Discourse and Policy 
Turkey’s nationalist body politic entertains 
a discourse centered on an eventual return 
of the refugees. However, the Turkish gov-
ernment is increasingly focusing on integra-
tionist policies such as improving employ-
ability, language, and vocational training. 
The Turkish presidency’s development plan 
for 2019–2023 advocates strengthening 
the bureaucratic architecture dealing with 
migration, aims at supporting the social 
adaptation of refugees, and stresses the ne-
cessity to develop efficient policies for the 
economic and social integration of refugees. 
The gap between official policy and pub-
lic discourse is very much shaped by the in-
creasingly hostile domestic political climate 
toward the refugees. The daily visibility of 
Syrians in Turkey’s urban centers contrasts 
with the government’s discourse, which 
foresees an eventual return of the refugees, 
and adds to the build-up of resentment. In 
the absence of a comprehensive, long-term 
strategy, the Turkish government is imple-
menting integrationist policies only when 
it is pressed to do so, and often on a piece-
meal basis. 
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Economic Lack of Transparency 
As an Advantage 
One of the most important factors easing 
the integration of Syrians into the Turkish 
economy is the structural lack of transpar-
ency of the process. Approximately one-
third of the Turkish economy is deemed 
non-registered or described as a shadow 
economy. This shadow economy allows 
Syrians to find work quickly without hav-
ing to obtain official work permits, to set 
up small businesses, and to make a living 
without having to navigate bureaucratic 
processes and pay high fees to obtain work 
permits. Given that a sizeable part of the 
Turkish economy functions behind the 
curtain of illegitimacy, it appears that Syr-
ian refugees have found breathing space 
within this shadow economy. However, the 
informal nature of Syrian employment also 
comes with considerable problems. Syrians 
compete with locals for low-income jobs in 
Turkey’s tight job market and are frequently 
asked to work 3–4 hours more than their 
Turkish counterparts – often for less in-
come. The current situation pits different 
ethnic and social groups against each other, 
and thus allows Turkish industry to reap 
the benefits of cheap labor. 
Although the shadow economy facilitated 
the quick absorption and employability of 
refugees in the early years, it is now neces-
sary to adopt policies and administrative 
measures to draw them into the formal 
labor market. This would be in line with 
Turkish government targets to reduce levels 
of informal employment from 36 percent to 
28.5 percent during the next five years. One 
proposed measure to facilitate this is to cre-
ate an economic environment that would 
encourage formal employment where Syr-
ian labor is involved. 
Conclusion 
Turkey is likely to continue to host millions 
of refugees in the foreseeable future. Their 
successful integration into Turkish society 
should be a key concern for European deci-
sion-makers. In this regard, Syrian refugees 
continue to dominate the transactional 
mode of Turkish-European relations. Berlin 
should continue to support Ankara on the 
issue of refugees, focusing on financial and 
technical support for their social and eco-
nomic integration. Securing formal employ-
ment is one of the most important drivers 
of integration. Enabling refugees to gain 
access to livelihoods through formal em-
ployment and improving the self-reliance 
of refugees should be key objectives of Euro-
pean assistance. Within this perspective, 
the German government should lead an 
effort within the European Union to offer 
Turkey trade concessions that are condi-
tional to the formal employment of Syrians. 
This would be similar to the 2016 EU-
Jordan Compact, in which the EU agreed to 
allow greater access to its market for goods 
produced by Jordanian companies employ-
ing refugees. Since the potential for hun-
dreds of thousands of new refugees enter-
ing Turkey due to ongoing developments in 
Idlib is increasing, initiating intra-European 
discussions on a potential “EU-Turkey 
Compact” would seem timely. Supporting 
Turkey’s efforts to facilitate the integration 
of millions of refugees in the face of ad-
verse conditions is not only important at 
the political level, but it could also help 
normalize the post-2016 psychological 
climate between Turkey and the EU. 
That said, European decision-makers 
should tread carefully and refrain from 
extending support at the expense of fun-
damental democratic values such as the 
rule of law and freedom of expression/ 
assembly and instead seek creative con-
ditionality where possible. 
Suat Kınıklıoğlu is a Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP. 
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